THE BRIGHTON BRANCH OF A.S.L.E.F.

COLLISION AT STREATHAM JUNCTION

19th JULY 1935

Involving  Driver J. Rugman and his Fireman W. Ayers,

extracted & adapted from the report by 

On the 19th July between Streatham Common and Balham Stations on the Southern Railway a accident which occurred at 

about 8.09 p-m. involving the 5.18 p.m. train from Brighton (7.05 p.m. from East Grinstead) to Victoria was travelling at high 

speed on the up main line, when the coupled wheels of the engine became derailed. Fortunately no further derailment ensued, 

and there were no complaints of injury or shock from passengers or staff.

The train comprised the bogie coaches weighing 86 tons; it was drawn by tank engine No.2075, Class I.3 super-heater 4-4-2 

type, running bunker first, and weighing in working order 76 tons. The engine was fitted with the Westinghouse and brake 

operating blocks on the coupled wheels only, controlled by the ejector working the vacuum brake on all wheels of the train.

After a few seconds preliminary rolling, apparently unusual at this place, the coupled wheels of the engine left the rails to the 

left or cess side in quick succession; the train was then brought safely to a stand in about 540 yards, and the adjacent down 

main line was not fouled. The 18 passengers were de-trained and completed their journey by road transport, all being cleared 

by 9 p.m.

The engine suffered minor damage only, and after re-railment at 11 p.m., was able to work the stock to the depot at Stewart’s 

Lane. Damage to permanent way was confined to chairs, keys and fish-bolts, 423 chairs being bro en, 408 on the cess side and 

15 only on the six-foot side.

The weather was fine, and had been warm and dry for several days.

1. From East Croydon, the last stop before the derailment, the line runs in a northerly direction for about 1/2-mile to Windmill 

Bridge Junction, where the Clapham Junction and Victoria line diverges to the left from the line to London Bridge; thence it 

continues for a proximately 3 miles via Selhurst, Thornton Heath, K o r b q , and Streatham Common Stations to Streatham 

North Junction, where the Mitcham line converges from the west; the point of derailment is about 370 yards, and Balham 

Junction about 1 1/2 miles further on. The line has four tracks, the up and down main being on the west side, so that the up 

main, on which the train was running, is next to the cess.

Approaching Streatham Common Station, gradients are falling generally for 3 miles at 1 in 264 to 1 in 100; thereafter through 

this station the line rises at 1 in 880to 1 in 284 for 3/4 mile, after which it becomes undulating about the site of the derailment, 

north of which to Balham Junction, gradients are falling at l in 264, and level.

2. Permanent speed restrictions on the up main line are :-

40 m.p.h. through Windmill Bride Junction. 

60 m.p.h. through Streatham North Junction 

50 m.p.h. through Balham Junction.

At the two latter points the restriction is in force on account of the nmssarily modified superelevation through the connections. 

These speed restrictions are included in a special publioa tion which mvers the whole of t!e Southern Railway system, and is 

issued to all the staff concerned.

There are no speed restriction boards

3 At the site of the accident the line runs in cutting with retaining walls of varying height. Through the trailing connection of 

Streatham North Junction the up main fine is on a right-handed curve of 40 chains radius; 217 yards further on curvature is 

again right-handed at 60 chains radius, but on1 for a length of 50 yards. The intervening 217 yards is occupied by leaving and 

entering transitions separated by a 50 yard length of tangent under Mitcham Lane Bridge. Derailment took place on the 67 yard 

length of transition immediately following the short 60 chain right-handed curve; beyond this point curvature reverses ta left-

handed, again via transition, at radii of 60 to 75 chains.

For 60 m.p.h. the superelevation prescribed by the Company's standard rule (85 per cent. of the theoretical) for a 40 chain 

curve is 4 1/2 inches and for a 60 chain curve 3 ins. In this locality however, on account of the junction and the succession of 

short curves of varying radii, it has not been found possible to adhere to the rule. 

5 The markings on the rail indicated clearly the sequence of derailment; 5 ft. 8 in. beyond be joint immediately preceding 

derailment a faint abrasion for a length of 7 ft. 5 in. along the running edge of the high (cess) rail was observed, after which 

there was e flange mark 19 f t . 11 in. long, the first derailed wheel thus dropping to the outside 33ft. forward of the joint. A 

bruise was found on the end of the next rail at about the centre of the head, followed by a flange mark somewhat deeper than the 

first, crossing to the outside of the rail in 9 ft, where the second wheel dropped over into the cess. It is therefore probable that 

the right trailing coupled wheel (left leading as running) was first derailed; it broke the fishbolts of the next joint. and the three 

preceding chairs, allowing the rail to give way outwards under the side pressure of the following driving wheel, the flange of 

which evidently struck the end of the next. rail, still more or less in its correct lateral position: once the flange was thus lifted to 

the head of the rail, derailment of the second wheel followed. It is possible that if the joint had not been released by the 

breakage of the fishbolts. the driving wheels would have kept to the rails. There was a second and smaller bruise on the rail end 

at the corner formed by the running edge and the end of the. rail, which was probably due to being struck by a following flange 

either of the engine bogie or of the train, fortunate without further derailment. If this following flange had struck the end of the 

rail more squarely the results might well have been serious.

Report and Evidence.

7. This train is booked to leave Brighton at 5.18 pm., East Grinstead at 7.5 p-m. and East Croydon at 7.59 p.m. running thence 

non-stop to Victoria in 16 minutes, representing an average speed of 39.61 miles per hour for the 10 miles 45 chains; the 

working book passing times allow 7 minutes for the 5 miles 14 chains from Windmill Bridge Junction to Balham Junction, or 

44-38 miles per hour. This non-stop timing from East Croydon to Victoria has been in force since January, 1933, prior to which 

a stop was included at Clapham Junction, but the 7 minute timing, pass to pass, from Windmill Bridge Junction to Balham 

Junction has stood for over six years.

For the whole of this time the train has been worked from East Grinstead, where engines are changed, to Victoria by a tank 

engine, and regularly for the last three or four years by an engine of the I3 class, this being the return engine working on the 

5.10 pm.from Victoria which arrives at East Grinstead at 6.23 p.m.; 42 minutes are thus available at East Grinstead for 

locomotive purposes which, I was informed, is sufficient for the necessary routine attention between trips but hardly allows a 

margin for turning, which can only be done by means of a triangle formed by St. Margaret's Junction at East Grinstead and a 

connecting goods line, the use of which is restricted to engines of moderate weight (e.g, the I.3 class); there is no turntable.

Driver J. Rugman, who had 36 years' service with the Company and 23 as a driver, worked the 5.10 .m.train from Victoria to 

East Grinstead, with engine No. '2075, running cl!imney first. The engine was generally in very good order and his examination 

at East Grinstead disclased nothing amiss before he started on the up journey, bunker first, at 7.5 p.m.

The run was perfectly normal as far as Mitcham lane Bridge. Leaving East Croydon one minute late, he had the regulator 

barely open, about half the first valve, and the screw reversing gear about 2 1/2 in. out of mid-gear, continuing at this setting 

until the derailment. Just after passing Mitclmm Lane Bridge at the normal speed of about 55 miles per hour, there were four or 

five oscillations of a rolling nature followed at once by a grating noise; he thought the first roll was to the left, but was not sure. 

Severe oscillation being unusual at this point, he immediately made a moderate application of the brake, not thinking it 

advisable to brake hard. As sped was reduced the grating sound changed to bumping and he made a full brake application 

about 100 yards before the train came to a stand.

He described the oscillation as violent but not enough to throw him off his feet; it was soft in character and there was no severe 

jolt such as might be caused by an axle box striking the horns. He had frequently driven engines of the I.3 class and this was the 

first time he had felt any serious movement on one of them; they had a reputation for occasional rolling, though they did not ( 

box or  nose). He was emphatic that here was no unusual oscillstion before passing under the bridge and, when the rolling 

started, he was not alarmed, but took action to steady the speed of the train as he always did when experiencing a roll with a 

tank engine at speed. He had worked the same train on the previous days of the week with a similar class of engine and with 

engine No. 2076 on. the Wednesday; in each case the engine was '' chimney first down the line and bunker first up the line ", and 

bad not experienced any oscillation at this pion t during the week.

At the time of derailment the tanks were approximately half full, and there was about 30 cwt. of coal in the bunker. After  re-

railment ‘he worked the empty stock with the same engine as far as Clapham Junction and noticed nothing wrong with the 

engine during this trip.

Fireman W. Ayres. with 18 years' service with the Company and 17 as a fireman, was certain that the oscillation began earlier, 

between the trailing points of Streatham North Junction and Mitcham Lane Bridge. There was no oscillation through the 

trailing junction, which he referred to it's a " good junction ". The oscillation was a side to side roll, not particularly severe, and 

no worse than the normal oscillation experienced at times with this class of engine when running fast, and be did not think there 

was "anything unusual happening ". The oscillation did not increase, and there were three or four rolls and then bumping as if 

the wheels were riding on the chairs; the rolling was soft, without jolt, and he contrasted the motion with that of the 4-4-0 

tender engines (B.4class) which " came down with a bang at the end of the roll '. He knew the I3 class of engine well, and had 

not noticed any difference in the motion whether running chimney or bunker first. 

Speed was about 55 miles per hour, it being at this point that the highest speed was attained by non-stopping trains between 

East Croydon and Victoria; but he had travelled faster here on other trains. 

 

At the time of derailment the tanks were approximately half full, and there was about 30 cwt. of coal in the bunker. After  re-

railment ‘he worked the empty stock with the same engine as far as Clapham Junction and noticed nothing wrong with the 

engine during this trip.

Fireman W. Ayres. with 18 years' service with the Company and 17 as a fireman, was certain that the oscillation began earlier, 

between the trailing points of Streatham North Junction and Mitcham Lane Bridge. There was no oscillation through the 

trailing junction, which he referred to it's a " good junction ". The oscillation was a side to side roll, not particularly severe, and 

no worse than the normal oscillation experienced at times with this class of engine when running fast, and be did not think there 

was "anything unusual happening ". The oscillation did not increase, and there were three or four rolls and then bumping as if 

the wheels were riding on the chairs; the rolling was soft, without jolt, and he contrasted the motion with that of the 4-4-0 

tender engines (B.4class) which " came down with a bang at the end of the roll '. He knew the I3 class of engine well, and had 

not noticed any difference in the motion whether running chimney or bunker first. 

8. Driver A. E. Mills and Driver A. Hoper, both experienced drivers, gave evidence as to the steady riding qualities of the I3 

class of engine at speeds of 50 m.p.h. and over. On the day in question Driver Mills drove engine No. 2090 (I.3 class) on the 

9.30 a.m. train from Tunbridge Wells West to Victoria, the timing of this train between East Croydon and Balham Junction being 

the same as that of the train concerned in the accident. He noticed no peculiar oscillation at any point in the journey and 

estimated his speed passing Streatham North Junction as 45 to 50

Driver Hoper on the same day worked the 4.51 pm. from Uckfield toVictoria with engine No. 2004 of the I1 class, a somewhat 

similar tank engine to those of the I3 class, of the 4-4-2 type, but with 5 ft. 6 in, coupled wheels; he passed the point of the 

derailment at the usual speed of 55 to 60 m.p.h. and noticed nothing unusual. He remarked that it was unusual to get a roll at 

that point, although there was generally a slight roll approaching Balham, “ though nothing much there”. There was no 

difference in motion whether running chimney or bunker first.

Motorman W. J. Packham, with 16 years experience as a driver, and motorman J. Broadbridge with 24 years, both drove 

electric trains over this section of line less than half-an-hour before the accident. Neither man experienced any unusual 

movement and the former said that although he always reported a rough piece of the road, this particular section bad no special 

reputation for bad riding. 

10. Sub-ganger J. Terrell, who had 8 years' service with the Company and 6 years as sub-ganger of the length in question, had 

been acting as ganger since the ganger’s retirement a week before. He examined the up main line at about 3.30 p.m. on the day 

of the accident nod found it in condition. At the last general fettling at this point two months ago he had beater packed a few 

joints, a lift, of perhaps 1/4in. to 1/2in. No joints were attended to on the day of the accident., but there was a joint left unfilled 

four rail lengths in rear of the point of derailment: this and a few other joints on the length had been shovel packed a month or 

six weeks previously, and, being “ on the full side “. had been left unfilled to encourage them to settle down. He had 

experienced little difficulty in keeping the up main in line since the curves were adjusted about five years ago and no more than 

the usual trouble on a line carrying heavy traffic in keeping the joints and the line generally to a good level. He had not himself 

gauged the line before the accident, but his predecessor used to do this regularly every six weeks or two months. 

The increases from standard will be noted, mileage since the last genera1 repair being 44,908, particularly the 13/32 in. 

(5/16in. .+ 1/32 in.), increase in respect of the pony axle, allowing a total free movement side to side (including journal 

clearance) of 27/32in. before the spring begins to exert its controlling force.

After the accident all bearing springs and the pony side control spring were tested for deflection, which in the case of the 8 coil 

springs of the bogie and of the pony control coil spring did not vary materially from design. The camber of the four springs of 

the coupled wheels under a test load of 7 tons 10 cwt. varied from 1 3/16in. to 1 5/16 in. as a against 1 in. designed, the sixth 

late of the left trailing spring being found broken 5 in. from one end. The designed camber of the pony bearing springs under a 

test load of 6 tons is also 1 in. ; as tested with this load after the accident the camber of the right-hand spring (left, leading, as 

running bunker first) was 1 3/16in. and of the left-hand spring practically correct at l in. bare, the top plate of this spring being 

found broken in the buckle. Except for the two fractures mentioned, the springs were in good condition.

12. On the 2nd August, accompanied by Mr. Sheppey, Eastern Divisional Locomotive Running Superintendent, I travelled on the 

footplate of an engine of this class, No. 2023, running bunker first when working an up semi-fast passenger train from Oxted to 

Victoria, a distance of 2o 1/2 miles; Rugman was the driver.

For the first 2 1/2 miles from Oxted speed up the rising gradient did not exceed 35 m.p.h., but on the following falling gradients 

and reverse curvature to Sanderstead a speed of slightly over 60 m.p.h. was attained; this track is not electrified, and I 

understand that the up line here has been recently relaid.

Leaving East Croydon 1 noted that the regulator was not opened beyond the first valve. From Windmill Bridge Junction, which 

was passed at 30 to 35 m.p.h., speed gradually rose down the falling gradients to over 60 m.p.h. at Streatham Common Station. 

It was still increasing when the train was steadied by a slight brake application, passing the site of the accident at about 60 

m.p.h., after which speed was reduced, Balham Junction (50 m.p.h. speed restriction) being passed at about45 m.p.h.

My short experience on the footplate leads me to concur in the evidence given as to the good riding qualities of this class of 

engine. 

Conclusion

13 The derailment of a well-balanced engine on track which is intact ( there was no evidence of absence of keys due to high 

temperature) and  maintained to a high standard is difficult to ascribe to any one cause, although the actual sequence of 

derailment in this case is open to little doubt. To account for this accident, therefore, a combination of factors must be sought, 

such as speed of the train, the characteristics of the road at the site, and the design and condition of the engine.

The initial derailment to the left of the trailing coupled wheels must have been brought about by heavy side pressure, aided in 

all probability by temporary relief of weight. on the left-hand wheel. Starting from this premise, the causes which map have led 

to this state of affairs must be considered.

14. Speed was undoubtedly high at the time of derailment, which occurred at the end of some three miles of falling gradients. 

According to driver Rugmam, the engine had been steaming, though lightly, since leaving East Croydon; the load consisted of 

three bogie coaches only, and this class of engine with 6 ft. 7 1/2 in. wheels and piston valves can freely attain high speed, as I 

myself observed from the footplate with more than double the load. Furthermore, signal-box timings of the train concerned 

indicated an average speed of nearly 60 m.p.h. from Windmill Bridge Junction to Streatham North Junction; although such 

timings should be accepted with reserve as sole evidence of speed over a short distance, they afford confirmation of an estimate 

arrived at by other means. Allowing for observance of the 40 m.p.h. restriction at Windmill Bridge Junction, this average would 

involve the attainment of well over 60 m.p.h. at the foot of the gradient. In spite of the estimate of 45 m.p.h. given by guard 

Emery and signalman Nunn, whose evidence in this respect I discount, I am therefore of the opinion that the speed of the train 

when the derailment took place cannot have been less than 65 m.p.h. and may well have been higher. Both enginemen thought 

the speed to be 55 m.p.h., but the existence ot the 60 m.p.h. restriction through Streatham North Junction, of which driver 

Rugman was aware, should be borne in mind. I do not however, regard the distance run by the train after the derailment, 

namely, 540yards. as evidence of speed, since driver Rugman wisely made only a light application of the brake on first feeling 

the unusual movement..

Nevertheless, I do not think that the rolling can have over become really severe; Driver Rugman was not alarmed. and Fireman 

Ayres, who was a particularly good witness, referred to it as nothing out of the ordinary. The evidence of these two men is 

conflicting which is understandable, as to the exact point at which the rolling started; although Driver Rugman thought this to 

be after Mitcham Lane Bridge when it started. Fireman Ayres was emphatic that it began between the trailing junction and the 

bridge; on the other hand it is significant that the commencement of the rolling was approximately coincident with passage over 

the length of tangent immediately following which, it should be noted, the waves of side wear on the high rail were first 

observed. Although I do not think that the side wear directly contributed to derailment, its presence in this form suggests that a 

certain unsteadiness in running may have been prevalent at this point, possibly due to the presence of superelevation on tangent 

track.

16. Although the increase from standard of axle box side play of engine No. 2075 was not abnormal in view of the mileage run, 

it cannot be overlooked that,9/16 in. wear had taken place between the pony casting and the main frame allowing a total 

uncontrolled side play to the pony axle, including axle box clearance, of  27/32 in.

Initial derailment occurred on a leaving transition from a 60 chain curve; regular displacement of the pony on this curvature 

would be slight and probably insufficient, with this amount of free play to bring the pony control spring into action. Guiding of 

the engine would thus devolve on the right trailing coupled wheel of large diameter and less favourably situated in respect of 

leverage. High flange pressure would result: accentuated by the usual nosing action round the curve although this is not unduly 

pronounced in engines of the I3class. Once the rolling started, temporary relief of weight would occur on alternate sides of the 

engine; should a roll to the right have coincided with the upward or negative phase of the hammer blow (2.68 tons at 45 r.p.s. or 

64 m.p.h.) of the right-hand trailing anp pled wheel, the combination of heavy flange pressure and relief of load would have set. 

up conditions favourable to climbing and subsequent derailment. In this connection it, is noteworthy that the spring deflection 

tests showed that the right.-hand pony bearing spring was appreciably less resilient than standard (1 9/16 in. camber under 6 

ton load as against 1 in. designed), which might allow it to assume momentarily more than its share of the load to the further 

relief of weight on the right trailing coupled wheel.

17. Reference was made by sub-ganger Terrell. who was considered to be a reliable man, to a rail joint which had been left 

opened out, or unboxed, four rail lengths in rear of the point of derailment, although on my inspection of t be site on the 31st 

July this joint had been filled in and, with the neighbouring joints. appeared to be of good level. I do not think that this can have 

had any bearing on the derailment. in view of the independent evidence of two steam train drivers and two motormen of electric 

trains. all of whom had passed over the site on the up main at hi$ speed on the day in question (the motormen of the two electric 

trains a few minutes before the accident) and had felt no unusual movement.

Remarks and Recommendations

18. While it is not possible to define with certainty the exact cause of this derailment. I feel that Driver T. Rugman must have 

been travelling faster than he realised and chat the most likely cause was too high a speed (over 65 m.p.h.) having regard to the 

two contributory factors, namely the reduced guiding effect of the pony axle, which was leading. and the varying curvature of 

the track, which necessitated appreciable superelevation on tangent. I do not consider, however, that the maintenance of the 

track was open to material criticism, having regard to its age and the punishing effect of the heavy multiple-unit traffic.

19. Although the 60 m.p.h. restrict ion through Streatham North Junction, if observed, should preclude the speed at any rate of 

steam trains, rising appreciably higher before speed is reduced for the 50 m.p.h. restriction at Balham Junction less than 1 1/2 

miles further on, I think it is questionable whether speeds of this order through the varying curvature at the site of the accident 

are not sufficiently high to permit of dangerous oscillation, particularly of a tank engine, when all conditions are favourable to 

its development.

Furthermore, I doubt whether a speed restriction of 60 m.p.h. through Streatham North Junction is sufficiently below the 

general level of speed at this point both of steam and electric trains to make much impression on a driver’s mind. The restriction 

therefore, is probably disregarded in practice, and under favourable conditions, as were present in this case, such as s free 

running engine, a light train running a little late, and good weather, speed may well rise to an undesirable limit. The Company 

is carrying out s regular programme of curve realignment some 234 miles of single track having been dealt with since January 

1933. The up main line between Streatham North Junction and Balham Junction has not yet been realigned, but I understand 

this is in hand although a preliminary chord survey does not appear to have disclosed any marks irregularity. I think the 

Company should consider, in view of all the possible traffic conditions, the desirability of imposing a speed restriction lower 

than 60 m.p.h. at this place, pending further consideration when this realignment is competed.