LONDON AND BRIGHTON RAILWAY REPORT
of Professor Barlow on the Accident of the 2nd October, 1841.
Also, on the falling in of the Patcham Tunnel.
October 15, 1841,
MY LORD, In compliance with your Lordship's request, contained in the instructions forwarded to me by Mr. Laing. I
proceeded on Wednesday, the 6th instant, to Brighton, having on my way arranged with Mr. Statham, the superintending
engineer of the line, to meet him at the Brighton station onThursday morning, to proceed up the line by a special engine
immediately after the den tch of the 10 h. 45 m. morning train.
This I did accordingly, but as your Lordship has been already informed, on our approaching the south end of Patcham Tunnel
a signal was made to stop, and on inquiring the cause we were informed of the dangerous condition of the front of that
structure, which was obviously in a falling state. Of course I did not proceed, but returned to Brighton with the engine, leaving
Mr. Statham at the tunnel. In a short time afterwards it appears that the front and a great part of the wing walls came down.
Before I left the tunnel a person was dispatched to end of it to warn the down train not to advance, and my arrival at the
Brighton Station prevented the dispatch of the 11h. 45m. train. The Patcham Tunnel is about two miles and a half from the
Brighton terminus. Steps were immediately taken to remove the rubbish, and by the next morning the line was again opened.
COPYHOLD CUTTING TRAIN CRASH
THE FIRST RECORDED ACCIDENT ON THE NEWLY OPENED LINE
2nd OCTOBER 1841
Involving (Leading Engine) Driver Charles Goldsmith & his Fireman Robert Marshall
& (Rear Engine) Driver James Jackson & his Fireman Robert Field
EXTRACTED AND ADAPTED FROM THE BOARD OF TRADE REPORTED
BY EARL OF RIPON
In compliance with your Lordship's request, contained in the instructions forwarded to me by Mr. Laing. I proceeded on
Wednesday, the 6th instant, to Brighton, having on my way arranged with Mr. Statham, the superintending engineer of the
line, to meet him at the Brighton station on Thursday morning, to proceed up the line by a special engine immediately after
the despatch of the 10 h. 45 m. morning train.
This I did accordingly, but as your Lordship has been already informed, on our approaching the south end of Patcham Tunnel
a signal was made to stop, and on inquiring the cause we were informed of the dangerous condition of the front of that
structure, which was obviously in a falling state. Of course I did not proceed, but returned to Brighton with the engine, leaving
Mr. Statham at the tunnel. In a short time afterwards it appears that the front and a great part of the wing walls came down.
Before I left the tunnel a person was dispatched to end of it to warn the down train not to advance, and my arrival at the
Brighton Station prevented the dispatch of the 11h. 45m. train. The Patcham Tunnel is about two miles and a half from the
Brighton terminus. Steps were immediately taken to remove the rubbish, and by the next morning the line was again opened.
- - - - - - - - - - -
This new disaster prevented my inspection of the Copyhold cutting, where the fatal over throw occurred on the second instant,
till the next day. I was then supplied with a special engine and carriage and was accompanied by Mr. Rastrick, the engineer-
in-chief of the line, to the Hayward Heath Station; our driver being the man Jackson, who had charge of the second engine
(Loco No.22) on the day of the accident, and whom I had thus the means of questioning on the spot, as I had also the labourer
Copley, who had made the signal to indicate the necessity of caution the moment before the first engine was thrown off the
line. I also saw at a beer shop the guard Hitchens, who was so severely injured, but he was too ill to be able to give me any
information. I saw this man again the next day; he then appeared better, but could give me no account; all that he knew was
the accident was momentary. The driver of the first engine (loco No. 17 was to pilot the train to Haywards Heath), Charles
Goldsmith, I only saw at the Brighton Station. Although in a weak state he is fast recovering, but his evidence amounts to little
more than that of Hitchens. He saw the signal given by Copley, but too late to be of any service. He states the awe d to have
been, on entering the cutting about 30 miles per hour but could a sign no caused for the accident.
On examining the place of the fatal occurrence nothing could be seen, or expected to be seen, after the lapse of six days, to
indicate its immediate cause, although there was sufficient evidence of the extreme violence of the concussion. Four of the
rails, weighing 75 lbs. per yard, or 375 lb. each, which had sustained the shock of the engine, were bent and twisted in all
directions, and one of them had on one side its flange stripped off for about two feet of its length, as if out by the moat
powerful shears; hut these rails having been replaced by other immediately after the accident, I could form no opinion from
the appearance of the mad that could lead me to any conclusion, although from other circumstances I feel not the slightest
doubt on the subject.
The place where the accident occurred is near the 36½ mile post from London, within about a mile of the north end of the
Hayward Heath Tunnel, which is a little below the Hayward Heath Station. The soil in this cutting, and for some distance
down the line, is of a very absorbent and treacherous character, becoming in its wet state nearly semi-fluid, mud yet when dry
or well drained it appears be perfectly sound; and I am bound to state that I stood at this and observed trains passing with
considerable speed both up and down the line, and that their motion was exceedingly steady, that is, free from rocking, which
is generally in obvious where a line is defective.
I have watched this effect, and have experimented upon it on several lines, and I am not aware that I ever saw less oscillatory
motion. But it must be observed that at this time everything that could be done had been hone to car off the water. For a day
or two before the accident the rain had been very heavy, and I have no doubt, from the nature of the soil, and the evidence of
Copley, that the road was at the time in what he describes "as a light state," which he afterwards explained by saying-when
there is much rain the wet pushes up the rails and makes them uneven, but that was not the case on Saturday.
I asked him, "If the road was not in that date on Saturday, and the speed not greater than usual, why he gave the signal;" hut
all I could learn was they had done so for two or three days.
Weighing these circumstances, viz., the nature of the soil, the great quantities of rain that had fallen, the admission that a
caution signal was made, and has been made for some days before, I feel no doubt whatever that the unsound bearing of some
one or more of them sleepers at the time was one cause of the accident.
With respect to the speed of the engine at the time, there are considerable discrepancies in the evidence. Jackson, the driver,
states that the speed did not exceed 20 or 23 miles per hour, although he admits that he has frequently passed this spot at 32
and 35 miles per hour.
Copley, the labourer above alluded to, says, that he
observed the engine at its usual speed. Hinge, the policeman
on the viaduct, says he gave the signal "stead," because he
observed the train was going rather faster than usual. Now
the question is, What has been the usual speed on this part
of the line. The average speed on the whole line for this train
is 25 miles per hour, including the time lost at four
intermediate stopping places, besides the stoppage at Horley
to attach the assistant engine.
This will require an average speed of at least 28 miles per
hour when travelling. Now for the first two miles after
leaving Horley the line ascends
PHOTOGRAPHER UNKNOWN
Ouse Valley Viaduct
1in 460 and then for four miles before reaching the Balcombe Tunnel it ascends 1 in 264, and thence descends for nearly six
miles to the Hayward Station at the same rate, that is 1 in 264.
From the notes and memoranda made by Sir Frederick Smith and myself in travelling together over some thousand miles of
railway, and over every variety of gradient. I have no doubt that to preserve an average speed of 28 miles per hour though
this12 miles would a speed of 32 miles per hour on the descending side.
Now it is admitted that the train was behind its proper time, a strong reason for not going slower than usual. Jackson denies
having seen the signal “steady" on the viaduct, he seems therefore to have had no good motive for going slower. and he states
that he has frequently passed this place at 35 miles per hour; and yet he asserts that just on this particular occasion, when
such a Frightful accident occurred, he was not proceeding at more than 20 or 23 miles per hour. His statement on this head is
certainly supported by the opinion of John Hardy. Eq.. M.P., who was a passenger, but it is greatly at variance with
probability, and with other evidence.
It has been seen that the usual speed down this plane is about 32 miles per hour, and Hinge admitted in his evidence before
the jury that he thought the speed was greater than, usual. It appears also that he made use of expressions soon after the
accident, which would simply that the speed was much greater than he stated before the coroner.
Since I have been engaged on this inquiry, I have had communication with two of the gentlemen on the jury, who met me
afterwards by appointment, and whose statement throws great doubt on this man's evidence. I quote the following from their
two letters.
“I beg to state that, although on the evidence brought before them the jury would come to no other conclusion than that at which they arrived, I felt, and still feel, by no means satisfied at the statement made by John Hinge, the policeman, on the highly important point of the speed with which the train was travelling at, or immediately before. the time of the accident. I was at the Copyhold bridge about two hours after the accident happened, when this police-man addressed m e and said, that when k first saw the train coming towards him he was sure something would happen from the speed at which it was going. He said he held up his hand to signal ‘ steady.' but that his heart was up in his mouth as they passed him; that he ran to a point in the mad where he could watch them farther, and in a very short time the accident occurred. He was heard to state this by other persons also, who have, I believe, informed you of the same thing The man, however, when called as a witness denied having made any such statement. Whether he had really forgotten what he previously said, or in the excitement and alarm occasioned by the accident had stated that which was not the fact, I am unable to say; but it is obvious, that the effects on the minds of the jury would have been very different if the original account of the policeman had been substantiated before them."
The other gentleman states as follows:-" Soon after the accident occurred I went to the spot, and accompanied one of the
inspectors and a gentleman, who is a stranger to me, to the shed where the bodies of the unfortunate victims had been
deposited. A policeman was in attendance, who volunteered the following remarks:-He said that he observed the train
approaching him near the viaduct (where he was on duty) at such a rapid rate that he was much terrified; that he fully
expected some accident to happened in consequence of the great speed with which they were proceeding, and was only
surprised it did not occur sooner than it did; that he held up his hand as a signal to slacken speed, but that no notice was
taken of it. Being one of the jury on the inquest held two days after, I insisted upon this man's evidence being heard. It was not
until after much delay had taken place, and the coroner more than once called for him, that he made his appearance. On
questioning him as to his former statement he totally denied having used such expressions as those which I had attributed to
him, declared that he had not been the least frightened, nor had entertained any apprehension of fatal consequences arising
from the speed, Which h he then said was not extreme; yet he allowed that he held up his hand as a caution, but could not be
certain that the signal ad been seen by the driver."
“As a juryman I did not think that I could also act as a witness; and not being aware at the time that the policeman had made
similar statements to others, who could be called upon to give evidence of the fact, I thought I ought not to allow the
policeman's previous assertions to influence the verdict, as they were not borne out by the evidence. But as it appears that
Government has commissioned you to investigate the circumstances which attended the accident, I feel that, being no longer
fettered by my position as a juryman, I should not be acting fairly towards the public if I withheld this statement from you."
These gentlemen, who have no wish that their names should be unnecessarily brought before the public, are, notwithstanding,
quite ready, if called upon, to substantiate what they have thus stated.
It is not, perhaps, my place to make any comments in this report on the conduct of the policeman; but it is impossible not to
conclude from these statements, and other circumstances, that the speed down the plane was excessive, and inconsistent with
the then state of the road; or, perhaps, with common prudence under any circumstances.
Of course the above statements impugn also Jackson's evidence; and I am sorry that the jury seam to have given too much
weight, in my opinion, to his explanations as to the probable cause of the accident This man states that he has been a driver
for four years and a half, three years in the service of the London and Brighton Company, before which he belonged to the
London and Birmingham Company. He states that he never met with any accident himself from the four wheeled engines on
the latter line; but had heard of a case of one of those engines getting off the line near Harrow.
Now surely this is very slight ground on which to come to a conclusion that such engines are unsafe, and for attributing to the
use of them two accidents on two successive days within about a mile of each other.
It appears from a statement I have received from Mr. Bury, the maker of these engines, and who is also the superintendent of
the locomotive department of the London and Birmingham Railway, that since the opening of that line, in July, 1837, they
have used no other than four-wheeled engines; that they have travelled more than three million miles, which is nearly
equivalent to making thirty thousand complete journeys between London and Birmingham; and that they have in no instance
met with a single accident that can be said to have been occasioned be the particular construction of the engine.
There is, however, as stated by Jackson, some difference between the Birmingham and Brighton four-wheeled engines. They
have both the same stroke and the same diameter of wheels; but the former has smaller cylinders, viz., some having twelve-
inch cylinders, weighing, full of water, under 10 tons; others of thirteen-inch cylinders, weighing, under like circumstances,
between 11 and 12 tons
On the Brighton line the four-wheeled engines have all fourteen-inch cylinders, and weigh, when charged with water and fuel,
between 13 and 14 tons. This increased size of cylinder requires increased dimensions; and, the wheels being of the same
diameter, necessarily raises the centre of gravity, and thus far they may be said to be more top-heavy, and are, perhaps, more
liable to rock; but the difference must be very inconsiderable.
In order to form some comparison of the top-heaviness of the two engines employed on that particular day when the accident
occurred, Mr. Rastrick obligingly permitted one of his assistants to make me two outlined elevations of them, that is, of a four-
wheeled engine of precisely the same dimensions as that which was destroyed, and the other of the identical six-wheeled
engine driven by Jackson. I forward with this report these two drawings, by which it will be seen, as nearly as it is possible to
form an opinion, that there is little or no difference in the place of the centre of gravity in the two engines. The upper part of
the boiler of the six-wheeled engine is the highest, but its water line is the lowest; as far, therefore, as relates to top heaviness
on which much stress is laid by Jackson, I am of opinion there is little or no difference.
In making these remarks, I beg it may be distinctly understood that I am not advocating, Or giving a preference to, the four-
wheeled engines. My object in referring to the subject is, that the jury, by giving too much weight to W at I consider to be an
erroneous opinion, have lost sight of the main causes of the accident, which I feel the strongest conviction were over driving
and a road partially injured by the heavy rains that had recently fallen. I think, moreover, that the withdrawing of those
engines from the line, in compliance with the recommendation of the jury, has a tendency to give a false confidence to the
Brighton passengers, while it is calculated to give unfounded alarm to those travelling on the London and Birmingham and
some other lines.
It now only remains, my Lord, to inform our Lordship of the result of my examination into the circumstances attending the
falling o the front of the Patcham tunnel This was, I believe, occasioned by the chalk being left at a considerable slope, which
caused the "backing in," when impregnated with the excessive heavy rains, to slide along the face of the chalk, and thus by its
pressure overcoming the resistance opposed to it. Mr. Rastrick also apprehends that a pipe. intended for a drain, had become
by some means choaked, which increased ' the evil. A slight crack, it appears, had been observed early on the Thursday
morning; but no danger was apprehended till immediately after the passage of the 10h. 45m. morning train.
In the fall of the front of the tunnel, a part of the brick work of the tunnel itself, for about six feet, was fractured. It remained
shored up the second day, hut was removed during the following night. The remaining part is an extremely fine piece of
brickwork, and is perfectly safe, only requiring for the present a constant watching, to remove any fragments of chalk that may
fall upon the line from the present nearly vertical face of the cutting. Steps will be immediately taken to reface the tunnel; and
it is, I believe, Mr. Rastrick's intention to lengthen the brickwork of it a little towards Brighton.
In the further compliance with your Lordship's instructions, after making this examination I proceeded along the line with the
special engine and carriage, accompanied by Mr. Rastrick, to Hayward Heath, stopping and examining everything that
appeared to require it. Mr. Rastrick here left me to return to Brighton, having first appropriated m me the coupe of the
carriage, in which I proceeded to Croydon ; and if I might venture to give a practical opinion relative to the construction and
present state of the line, I should say that the engine has done, and well done, everything that could be effected; but he has
had to deal in some parts with very treacherous materials, and time will be required for them to take up a firm and solid state.
In other parts, where the soil is better, the line is very perfect. The bridges, the viaducts, and four out of the five tunnels, are,
in regard of interior brickwork, in perfect condition; but the Hayward Heath Tunnel is much oppressed with water from the
late excessive rains; but great efforts are being made to carry the water off, and a few d a p of fine weather will enable much
to be accomplished. Those parts of the line which have suffered most from the rains are two short pieces of the embankment
south of the Redhill Station ; another considerable portion south of the Balcombe Tunnel, and just beyond the Hayward Heath
Tunnel southward.
Sir Frederick Smith, in his general approval of this line, has drawn the attention of the engineer to certain portions of it, on
which he conceived the safety of the public called for specific precautions a d reduced speed. These precautions have been
rendered more particularly necessary in consequence of the recent heavy rains, which have also produced some other weak
points; and I conceive that it is most desirable that at present, and during the approaching winter, more time should be
allowed for the journey, in order that great caution may be observed in those parts where the line has most sufferer.
I have ascertained that both Jackson and Charles Goldsmith were discharged servants of the London and Birmingham
Company, but Goldsmith had never been a driver.
* On 6th June, 1851 a Driver Jackson died as result of the Newmarket Arch near Falmer derailment. It is wonder if this was the same driver who was involved the above train crash, Driver Jackson died as a result of this accident
Driver Jackson had previously been employed as an engine driver since the early part of 1837, by the London & Birmingham company. After being discharged from this company in c1838, driver Jackson later found employment with the L.B.S.C.R. having been an engine driver for about a year and half.
LETTE from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Frederic Smith,
covering Professor's Barlow's Report, on the Accident on the London and Brighton Railway.
Board of Trade, October 15, 1841.
MY LORD,
Having carefully considered the accompanying report from Professor Barlow, respecting the late fatal accident on the London
and Brighton Railway, and, on the present state of the works on that line, I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that I
occur with the Professor in attributing that accident partly to the excessive speed used on the occasion in question, and partly
to the defective state to which the road had been reduced by the long continuance of heavy rain; hut, believing as I do, that
these two causes mainly contributed to produce this unfortunate catastrophe, yet I am most decidedly of opinion that the
accident would not have happened but for the improper use of two en mes a-head on a long gradient, of rather severe
inclination, falling in the direction in which the train was running.
Scarcely any practice can, in my opinion, be more imprudent than running a train with two engines a-head on such a plane at n
high velocity, even over a road well consolidated by time, and the danger of such a proceeding is obviously most fearfully
increased when it is permitted on a line which has not acquired that degree of steadiness which is attainable only from long
use; and, while this practice is dangerous, it is not only altogether unnecessary, but expensive to the Company.
Your Lordship will readily perceive the utter impossibility of two drivers, however dexterous they may be, so regulating the
speed of their respective engines, on such a plane as that on draw chains" of both uniformly stretched, and it is quite clear that
when the leading engine sometimes draws the other, and is sometimes pushed by it, an irregular motion must result, having a
tendency to disturb the balance of the leading engine, and more especially if that engine be the lighter, and carried by only
four wheels.The risk is much increased on a line where the evenness of the rails has been disturbed by bad weather.
In calling the attention of the London and Brighton Company therefore, to the necessity of a considerable reduction in their
rate of speed on the falling gradients, and of paying constant and close attention to the state of their road, I would recommend
that they should be urged to discontinue the use of the assistant engine in the descent of their long inclined planes.
A most important and very safe practice prevails on some of the northern railways, which should be immediately introduced
on the Brighton line, and ought to be adopted on ail those of recent formation, as it affords an excellent, constant, and almost
unerring check on the contractors. who are generally held responsible to maintain the road in good order for 12 months after
the opening:
The practice to which I allude, is that of making each policeman carry a gauge, and walk over his beat, before the arrival of
every train, trying the gauge of the rails in such a number of points as to ascertain whether the line is throughout in perfect
order; and it is the policeman's duty to stop a train, or give the signal of caution, according to the degree of risk he may
discover.
I find that the point where it is presumed the engine first became irregular in its motion, just before the accident, in one to
which I had called the especial attention of the Company, as requiring careful and cautious driving and watching.
Professor Barlow very justly observes, that it will be the rase on the London and Brighton, as it is on all new lines, that for
some time to come fresh weak points will be produced by unfavourable weather, and I therefore conceive it will be proper not
only to press upon the Company the necessity of devoting the most vigilant and unremitting care to the state of their works
generally and of the permanent way in particular, but that it will be indispensably necessary that this line, on which so large a
traffic may be expected, should have the especial attention of this department, and be occasionally inspected during the winter
after had weather, in order that such suggestions may from time to time be offered to the Com any as may relieve the Board of
Trade from alt responsibility as regards the public safety on this railway.
I have, &C.,
FREDERIC SMITH
Letter sent to the London and Brighton Railway Company,
with Extracts from Sir F. Smith’s and Professor Barlow's Reports.
October 19,1841
SIR, Board of Trade,
With reference to the late accident on the London and Brighton Railway, I am directed, &C., to inform you that their Lordship
recommend to the Directors of the London and Brighton Railway Company the adoption of the following precautions, which
have been recommended by Sir F. Smith and Professor Barlow :-
l. That the speed in descending the long inclined places upon the line, and also upon all portions of the line which may appear
to be not perfectly consolidated, should he reduced, and strict orders issued to prevent such limited rate of speed as is thought
proper for safety from being ever exceeded.
2. That with a view to this the time-table should be revised, and the average rate of speed along the line, which is stated by
Professor Barlow to be in some case as high as 25 miles per hour, should be considerably diminished.
3. That the practice of running trains with two engines a-head down long inclined planes, should be discontinued.
Sir F. Smith further suggests, that a practice which prevails on some of the northern railways might with advantage be
adopted, as affording an excellent check on the contractors, who we responsible for maintaining the road in good order, viz.,
of making each policeman carry a gauge, and walk over his beat before the arrival of train, trying the gauge of the rails in such
a number of points as to ascertain whether the line is throughout in good order, and making it his duty to stop or caution trains
according to the degree of risk he may discover . Their Lordships recommend this suggestion for the consideration of the
Directors.
PHOTOGRAPHER UNKNOWN