THE BRIGHTON BRANCH OF A.S.L.E.F.

BUXTED & CROWBOROUGH

 COLLISION  BETWEEN A FAILED TRAIN AND ASSISTING ENGINE

3rd JANUARY 1909

Brighton Driver S. Smith & his Fireman Henry Gasson

& Tunbridge Wells West Driver William Hartridge and his Fireman H. Bonwick

extracted and adapted from the report by

P.G. Von Donop Lieut. Colonel R.E.

In this case, as a light engine was proceeding from Crowborough towards Buxted in the facing direction on the down line in 

order to assist a down passenger train, the engine had broken down between the two above named stations, the driver of the 

light engine failed to stop in time, with the result that it ran into the engine of the disable passenger train. Both engines were 

derailed, as also were the leading bogies of the first two carriages of the passenger train. Three passengers in the train 

complained of slight injuries; five of the Company’s servants, who were on the light engine, were also injured, one of them 

somewhat seriously.

The engine of the passenger train was a D1 Class No.271, four wheels coupled tank engine, with a pair of trailing wheels; it 

was standing chimney first at the time of the collision, and it was fitted with the Westinghouse automatic brake working blocks 

on all the wheels, and with a hand brake working the same blocks.

The train consisted of the following vehicles attached to the engine in the order given. Two third class carriages, one third class 

brake, two composites and one third class brake, all consisting of 8 wheels.All these vehicles were fitted with the Westinghouse 

automatic brake working blocks on all their wheels.

The light engine a Class D3 engine No. 385, was a four wheels coupled tank engine with a trailing bogie, and it was running 

chimney first at the time of the collision; it was fitted with the Westinghouse automatic brake working blocks on the four coupled 

wheels, and with a hand brake working the same blocks.

The damage to permanent way was very slight.

DESCRIPTION

This collision occurred between Buxted and Crowborough on the Tunbridge Wells - Brighton branch of the London, Brighton, 

and South Coast Railway. The line between these two stations is a double one, and its direction is approximately north-east and 

south-west, the down line (on which this collision took place) lying to the north-west. The point at which the collision occurred 

was situated 1 mile 36 chains from Buxted Station and 3 miles 24 chains from Crowborough Station.

EVIDENCE

S. Smith, driver, states : I came on duty on the 3rd January at 6.24 am. to work till 2 pm. I came off duty on the previous day at 

10.15 p.m. I was in charge of the engine D1 Class No.271 of the 9.40 a.m. passenger train from Brighton to Tunbridge Wells. 

My engine was a four wheels-coupled tank engine with a pair of trailing wheels. It was fitted with the Westinqhouse automatic 

brake working blocks on all wheels and with a hand brake working the same blocks. The brakes were in good order. We loft 

Brighton punctually at 9.40 a.m. and stopped at Buxted at the usual time ; we had no special trouble with the engine up to the 

time he reached Buxted. The road was in a very greasy state and we had had a little trouble from slipping. Shortly after leaving 

Buxted a right hand link on my engine broke. Directly I found there was something wrong I brought my engine to a stand. I then 

got down from the engine to ascertain what had happened and found that my engine was unable to go on. 1 told the guard that 

we were broken down and that we should have to stay there until we got another engine and told him to carry out his rules. 

Henry J. Gasson states: I have been in the service of the Company about 11 years, and haw been a fireman about seven years. 

On the 3rd January I was working with driver S. Smith and I was working the same hours as he was. I was with him on the 

engine of t'he 9.40 a m . passenger train from Brighton to Tunbridge Wells. 1 remember our train stopping at Buxted. Up to that 

line we had only had a little trouble with the engine, owing to it slipping on the greasy road. Shortly after leaving Buxted a link 

on the engine broke. We came to a stand as quickly as possible, and found out what was broken. I asked my mate for a wrong 

line form, which was filled in, and I started for Crowborough with two detonators in my hand. I have been on the line between 

Buxted and Crowborough several times and am fairly acquainted with it. I know there are two viaducts between Buxted and 

Crowborongh, though I do not know the names of them. The light engine came to a stand we had passed the first viaduct from 

Buxted ; I think it was at a distance of 500 or 600 yards from this viaduct. I walked on towards Crowborough Station, and when 

I was about 100 yards from the tunnel I put down the two detonators on the line. After I got through the tunnel I saw that, the 

catch point's were being protected in the proper way. I saw that there was a man there to attend to the points, so that the relief 

engine could proceed on the down line. I then went on to the Crowborough signal-box and showed the’ wrong lille order form to 

the signalman, and he told me to see the stationmaster. I then went to see the station master, who was on the platform coming 

down to meet me. He seemed to know all about the breakdown, having been in communication with the guard from Buxted. I 

then waited at Crowborough until the engine arrived from Tunbridge Wells. When the engine arrived the station master showed 

driver Hartridge the wrong line order form. The engine then crossed over on to the down line. As soon as the engine arrived I 

had gone on to the footplate, and I waa on the engine when it crossed over on to the down line. As soon as I got on the engine 

driver Hartridge asked me where the disabled train was situated. I told him that we were this side of the first viaduct from 

Buxted. As soon as we started driver Hartridge asked me to fire the engine, and when we had got a little way he said “Do you 

mean Greenhurst Viaduct?” I said I did not know the name of the viaduct, but that it was the first onr from Buxted. I am quite 

positive that I did not tell driver Hartridge that he would find the disabled engine close to the second viaduct; I only said that he 

would find it this side of it. I continued firing the engine for considerable distance down. Soon after we came out of the tunnel, 

and while I was still firing, we ran over two detonators. These were the two which I had put down. On running over these 

detonators the speed of the engine was checked very slightly. At the time the engine ran over the detonators its speed was from 

10 to 15 miles an hour. When we had got a considerable distance further on I said to fireman Bonwick that I could not get any 

more coal, and that he would have to get into the bunker before he could get any more. On this he went behind me and got the 

hammer, and went up on the bunker. Very soon after this happened I saw driver Smith standing by the side of the lining waving 

his hands. At the same time that I driver Smith I saw the disabled train in front of me. I estimated that when I first saw the train 

we were about 100 yards distant from it. I think, however, that I saw the train as soon as it was possible for me to do so, and I 

now therefore think that we must have been 200 yards from it when I first sighted it. I think the speed of the engine at the time 

we sighted the train was quite 15 miles an hour. The brake had been applied occasionally whilst we were running down from the 

tunnel. The driver appeared to me to have the engine well under control. The driver saw the train in front of us at the same time 

as I did. I at once applied the hand brake with full force. The driver also applied his brake with full force. The wheels of the 

engine “picked up,” and we ran into the stationary engine at a speed which I estimated at about 20 miles an hour. The 

stationary engine was standing in the same place that I had left it. I am acquainted with Rule 221(g), and I quite understand the 

reason why I was sent forward with the wrong line order form, and I quite understood that part of my duty was to advise the 

driver of the relief engine as to where my train was situated. It was before we passed through the tunnel that driver Hartridge 

asked me the second time as to where the train was situated. After that occasion I gave Hartridge no further information as to 

where the train was situated. While we were approaching the train I gave him no further warning on the matter. I did not do so 

because, after having given driver Hartridge the information which I had, I felt quite confident that he knew where the disabled 

train was. When we approached the curve I knew that we were getting near to the train, but we were really nearer to it than I 

thought we were. We had got there much quicker than I thought. Had the rails not been so greasy I think we should have 

stopped all right. Just after I saw driver Smith another pair of detonators went off under our engine. I was keeping a look out at 

the time we approached the train, and I think I saw it as soon as I could have done. I knew the line was on a falling gradient 

from the tunnel to the point where the disabled train was standing. 

William Hartridge, driver, recalled, states: I came on duty on the 3rd January at 6.30 a.m. to work to 2.30 p.m. I came off duty 

the previous day at 9.15 p.m. On that morning I received instructions to leave Tunbridge Wells with a light engine to assist a 

train which had broken down between Crowborough and Buxted. I left Tunbridge Wells at 11.20 a.m. My engine was a Class D3 

engine No. 385, a four wheels coupled tank engine with trailing bogie. I was fitted with the Westinghouse automatic brake 

working blocks on the four coupled wheels and with a hand brake working the same blocks. My brakes were in perfect order. We 

reached Crowborough at 11.38 a.m., and at Crowborough my engine was put on to the wrong line, and from there I proceeded 

to the disabled train on the wrong line, the station master giving me instructions to do so. After my engine was put on to the 

wrong line the signalman gave me a right away hand signal on that line. The fireman from the disabled engine joined me at 

Crowborough and accompanied me to the scene of the accident. Fireman Gasson told me that I should find the disabled engine 

close to the second viaduct, that is the second viaduct we should come to when running from Crowborough. We left 

Crowborough at 11.43 a.m.,the Crowborough station master, fireman Gasson and two fitters being on my engine. To make sure 

there being no accident I again asked fireman Gasson if he was sure where he had left the disabled engine. He again told me 

that it was was on the second viaduct. I said do you mean Greenhurst Viaduct? He said I do not know the name, but it is the 

second one from here, that is the one nearest Buxted. Before leaving Crowborough I ascertained that the catch points were set 

right for me. I proceeded through Crowborough tunnel very cautiously giving a prolonged whistle. When about 600 or 700 

yards on the south side of the tunnel I ran over two detonators, and from that point forward the brake was applied occasionally 

to check the engine. I maintained a fair speed until we passed over two more detonators. The brake was then applied with good 

force, and when rounding a curve at that point I was absolutely amazed to see the obstruction in front of me. I applied all the 

power I had, reversed the engine, applied steam and sand, and opened the regulator, but she did not seem to answer to it a bit. 

The wheels picked up instantly, and instead of reducing the speed I very much think that she gained speed and we collied with 

the disabled engine. I estimate our speed over the section between the two sets of detonators at from 10 to 15 miles an hour, and 

I estimate the speed at the tie of the collision at about the same figure. The rails on the morning in question were exceptionally 

greasy. I think that we were from 100 to 150 yards distant from the disabled engine when I first saw it. I did not see it before the 

second set of detonators went off. At the time we were approaching the disabled train, fireman Gasson was standing at the 

handbrake and I know he was keeping a look out. Fireman Gasson said nothing whatever to me on the footplate after leaving 

the tunnel. After passing over the first two detonators I turned off steam and I never turned on steam again until the engine was 

reversed. I am thoroughly well acquainted with the road on which I was running, and I attribute this accident entirely to my 

finding the disabled engine 600 yards nearer than I expected it from the information given me by the fireman. The station master 

showed me the wrong line order form before I left Crowborough. I had applied the automatic brake several times before 

reaching the second set of detonators, and after the second set of detonators it was applied continuously with full force. I did not 

send my fireman on foot in front of my engine in accordance with Rule No.223. I did not carry this Rule out as I considered that 

as I had the fireman of the disabled engine with me I need not do so. If I had had an ordinary clean rail I feel confident I should 

have stopped my engine in spite of the short warning I had.  

H. Bonwick, fireman, recalled, states: On the 3rd January I was working the same hours as driver Hartridge, and I was on the 

light engine which went to the relief of the disabled train. We were put on the wrong line at Crowborough station, and ran on 

that line to the disabled train. We received information at Crowborough as to where the disabled train was. Fireman Gasson 

told me that the disabled train was just this side of the further viaduct. Just on the station side of the tunnel two detonators went 

off. At this time I did not think we were running more than six or seven miles an hour. Steam was slightly turned on. I do not 

know when steam ws turned off. We then ran over a second set of detonators about 150 yards from the disabled engine. I cannot 

say what our speed was at that time. I cannot say whether steam was still turned off, as I was in the bunker trimming the coal. 

Immediately after the second detonators went off I heard the brake applied, but the collision occurred. I think our speed, when 

the collision occurred, was between 10 and 15 miles an hour. I do not know when the brakes were applied, but just about the 

time the second detonators went off I heard the noise of the Westinghouse brake being applied. While I was in the bunker 

fireman Gasson had hold of the hand brake. The rails were in a very greasy condition. I was not injured in any way.

Mr. L.A. Brightly, states: I am station master at Crowborough and have held that appointment since May, 1908. About 11 a.m. 

on the 3rd January I received information that the train was broken down between Buxted and Crowborough and that 

assistance would be needed. I at once telegraphed and telephoned to Tunbridge Wells for the assistance of an engine. I then 

went into the signal box and spoke to the guard on the telephone. Th fireman then arrived at Crowborough and showed me a 

wrong line order form. Subsequently the light engine arrived at the station and I proceeded on it to the scene of the accident. I 

heard the fireman of the disabled train giving information to the driver of the light engine as to where the disabled train was, 

and I heard mention of the second viaduct. There seemed to be no misunderstanding between the two men as to where the 

disabled train was. Soon after passing through the tunnel I heard one or two detonators explode. At that time the light engine 

was travelling at about 15 miles an hour. I do not thine that steam was used after the first detonators went off. To the best of my 

recollection no more detonators exploded until we got quite close to the train and then another detonator exploded. My 

impression is that we sighted the disabled train before the second detonator went off. The light engine was then running ar I 

should think from 10 to 15 miles an hour. The driver at once applied the Westinghouse brake harder - I think it was already on 

at the time. I was surprised at finding the disabled train where it was. I do not know what the fireman of the disables train was 

doing at the time we were approaching. The speed of the engine did not appear to decrease after the brake was applied. The 

rails were very greasy indeed. Before leaving Crowborough I told the driver to proceed with caution as I understood there were 

some people walking up the line. A good look out was kept all the time. I cannot say how far we were from the disabled train 

when I first sighted it. I am not quite clear as to what conversation actually took place between the driver and the fireman as to 

the position of the disabled train, but the impression on my mind was that the disabled train was near the second viaduct. 

CONCLUSION

The circumstances under which this accident occurred were as follows.

The 9.40 a.m. down passengers train from Brighton to Tunbridge Wells left Buxted station for Crowborugh at 10.36 a.m.; when 

about one mile from Buxted, driver Smith, who was in charge of the engine, notice that something on his engine was striking the 

ballast and sleepers, and on stopping the train to ascertain what had gone wrong he found that one of the links was broken. He 

at once informed guard Suter that the train would have to remain where it was until another engine came to its assistance. Suter 

forthwith proceeded to the rear of his training took the necessary steps to protect it; he then proceeded back to Buxted and 

telegraphed to Crowborough for assistance to be sent. The station master at Crowborough in turn wired to Tunbridge Wells for 

a light engine, and the latter arrived at Crowborough station at 11.38 a.m. Meanwhile driver Smith, knowing that the engine to 

assist him would have to come from Crowborough on the wrong line, made out a wrong line order form on the Form B referred 

to in the rule quoted above, and gave it to his fireman, Gasson by name, to take forward to Crowborough, so that the engine 

coming to their assistance might be able to run from Crowborough to the site of the accident on the wrong line; and at the same 

time he gave him two detonators to put down on the line. Fireman Gasson proceeded accordingly to Crowborough, and he 

states that he placed the detonators on the line near the south end of the tunnel, i.e. two miles ahead of the train, and showed 

the Wrong Line Order Form to the signalman at Crowborough. After Gasson had started for Crowborough, driver Smith himself 

waled forward and put down two additional detonators on the line, about 150 yards ahead of his engine. The Company’s riles 

and regulations as to the right procedure to be carried out under the circumstances of the case were therefore strictly adhered to 

by the staff of the disabled train, and every precaution was taken by them to ensure that assistance should reach them promptly 

and safely.

Fireman Gasson joined the light engine at Crowborough, and he states that he at once informed driver Hartridge as to where 

the disabled train was situated. There is a certain amount of contraction as to the information given by firman Gasson to driver 

Hartridge on that point. Cartridge states that Gasson informed him that he would find the disabled engine close to the second 

viaduct. Hartridge further states that, to make sure of there being no accident, he subsequently asked Gasson a second time if he 

was sure as to where he left the disabled engine, and Gasson, he states, told him in reply that it was on the second viaduct. 

Driver Hartridge therefore maintains that he had every reason to expect that he would find the disabled engine at all events 

close to the second viaduct. Fireman Gasson, on the other hand states that in the first instance he merely told Hartridge that the 

train was “ his side of the first viaduct from Buxted,” and that when subsequently questioned as to which viaduct he was 

referring to, only stayed that he did not know the name of the viaduct, but that it was the first one from Buxted. The information 

given by Gasson was clearly, even by his own account, very vague.

Mr. Blightly, the station master at Crowborough, who accompanied the light engine, heard fireman Gason giving information to 

driver Hartridge as to where the train was situated; he heard mention made of the second viaduct, but he is not clear as to 

exactly what was said about it; the impression made on his mind was, however, that the disabled train was near the second 

viaduct, and that there was no misunderstanding between the two men as to where it would be found.

The light engine accordingly proceeded on the wrong line from Crowborough towards the disabled train. Shortly after emerging 

from the tunnel it ran over two detonators, and there appears to be no doubt that at that point steam was turned off and that the 

engine was then allowed to run by gravity down the falling gradient. Hartridge states that in running down the gradient the 

automatic brake was frequently applied to check the speed, and he does not think that it was ever in excess of from 10 to 15 

miles an hour. Whilst travelling at this speed, and at a distance of about 900 yards from the viaduct, a second set of detonators 

were exploded under the engine, and then suddenly Hartridge to his surprise sighted the disabled engine. At the time of sighting 

it Hartridge estimates that his speed was still at from 10 to 15 miles an hour, and that he was not more than 100 to 150 yards 

distant from it. The automatic brake and sand were at once fully applied, and the engine was reversed and steam turned on, but 

the wheels immediately skidded, and all witnesses agree that the speed of the engine was practically not reduced at all previous 

to the actual collision.

Driver Hartridge states that after leaving Crowborough fireman Gasson said nothing at all further to him as to the position of 

the disabled engine, and Gasson himself admits that he did not give Hartridge any further warning when they were approaching 

it.

The special reason for fireman Gasson’s presence on the relief engine was, as stated in the Rule quoted above, that he should be 

able to advise the driver of it as to where the disabled train was standing, and Gasson admits that he quite understood that it 

was with that object that he was there. The information however which he gave to driver Hartridge before leaving Crowborough 

was vague and misleading, as it certainly conveyed the impression to both driver Hartridge and Mr. Blightly that the disabled 

train was standing close to the viaduct, whilst as a matter of fact it was 700 yards from it. And in addition to giving this vague 

information. Masson further failed in his duty by neglecting to give any warning to Hartridge when they were actually 

approaching the disable train, though he ought to have known that they were doing so. The only explanation that he can give for 

this omission is that he did not think that they were so near to it as they really were. the want of care which Gasson showed in 

carrying out his duties must,I consider, be regarded as the primary cause of this accident, and the responsibility for it must 

therefore rest mainly on him.

Driver Hartridge attributes the accident, as far as he was concerned, firstly to the fact of his finding the disabled train 700 

yards from the viaduct instead of close to it, as he had been led to expect from fireman Basson’s information; and secondly to the 

slippery state of the rails, which prevented his stopping his engine after he had sighted the train.

Hartridge was undoubedtly misled by the information given to him by Gasson, and he did not receive from the latter the 

assistance which he was entitled to expected, but nevertheless he cannot be entirely exonerated from blame in the matter. He 

knew that he was running on the wrong line, that the gradient was a falling once, and that the the rails were greasy; under those 

conditions his speed should have been restricted so as to ensure his having his engine well under control. But even though he 

obtained, or at all events should have obtained, a view of the disabled engine when he was 200 yards distant from it, he was 

unable to bring his engine to stand in time to avert the collision. Driver Hartridge did not therefore act with the care that the 

circumstances called for, and he must therefore bear some of the responsibility for this accident.

The Company gives driver Hartridge an exceedingly good character, and they inform me that he has always proved himself a 

most zealous servant. It appears therefore to be probable that it was his zeal to bring assistance to the disabled train as quickly 

as possible which led him to act without sufficient caution.            

APPENDIX

Damage to Engines and Rolling Stock

Train Engine No.271. - Left hand quadrant link broken, causing failure; cylinders, castings broken; leading buffer beams and 

engine frames smashed; trailing buffer beams and engine frames twisted; back tool box completely smashed; all buffers wrench 

off and damaged.

Engine No. 385 - Leading buffer beam strained and twisted; both buffer heads broken off.

Coach 1319 - Three end panels of body damaged and stove in; both leading buffer heads wrenched off; buffer damaged; frame 

of leading bogie frame strained; trailing axle box of leading bogie broken; trailing end of body badly staved in at bottom; both 

buffers damaged; left hand leading box of trailing bogie broken; body of coach shifted on frame.

Coach 690 - leading buffer casting broken; leading buffer beam slightly damaged; right hand trailing buffer casting broken.