A collision of a passenger train with a pair of buffer stops at the London Bridge Station of the London, Brighton, and South
Coast Railway, which occurred on the 7th May, and by which 20 persons were more or lees injured, the most severe apparent
injury being a nose badly cut.
The train ro which the accident occurred was South London train from Victoria to London Bridge. It left Victoria at 10.25 a.m.
on the 7th May, and consisted of an engine and tender, guard’s van with break, part of it fitted for third class passengers, three
third class, a composite second, two first class, a composite first class, one third class and a third class with break van
attached, in all 10 vehicles, coupled in the order stated, with a guard in each van. The driver considerably over the platforms at
Peckham and Old Kent Road, and slightly at Rotherhithe. At Peckham the head guard spoke to the fireman about not using his
break properly. From Rotherhithe to London Bridge the train proceeded at the usual rate, and on passing the signal box near
the Victoria or south end of the platform was going so slowly as to nearly come to a standstill at the south end of the
platforms. About this point the driver appears to have put on steam to take him up the platform, and the train moved forward
steadily until about 30 yards from the buffer stops, when it suddenly shot ahead as if shoved from behind by an engine. The
driver immediately reversed his engine, and whistled for the guards’ breaks, but too late to prevent collision with the buffer
stops. Neither driver nor fireman was thrown down by the collision; ad it is probable but little injury would have occurred to
the passengers, had not many have their seats preparing to alight. There appears no reason to doubt but that the breaks of the
tender and front van were on at the time of the collision, and that the cause of the sudden ahead of the train was owning to the
guard of the rear van having taken off his break, the screw of which was found to be completely out.
The driver, fireman, and guards all well knew the road from Victoria to London Bridge, but the former had been principally
accustomed to work it with tank engines; and had only on one previous day, and for two journeys on the morning of this day,
been working it with an engine and tender. The guards also appeared to have been more accustomed to work with trains drawn
by tank engines. The break power of these latter being so much greater than that of tender engines, there is a tendency on the
part of guards to more or less neglect their own breaks when working with tank engines, and to errors of judgment on the part
of drivers when frequently transferred from one description of engine to another.
To such an error of judgment on the part of the driver on the preeent occasion, in putting on more steam than his own break
power would fully enable him to control, and to the error of the guard in the rear van in removing his break before the train
had come to rest, this accident; is no doubt to be attributed.
The facts seem to point to the expediency of not changing driven from one description of engine to another more than can
absolutely be avoided.
Although not bearing directly on this accident, I think it right to state that there was no communication in this train between
the guards and driver.